Transcript
Transcript: Contemporary Issues in Canadian Federalism Series: Federations Around the World – Comparing Canada and Switzerland (TRN5-V57)
[00:00:00 Video opens with animated CSPS logo]
[00:00:06 André Lecours appears in full screen. Text on screen: André Lecours University of Ottawa / University of Ottawa]
André Lecours: Hi everyone. My name is André Lecours, I am a professor at the School of Political Studies at the University of Ottawa. It is my great pleasure today to be working in collaboration with the Canada School of Public Service to present to you this session on federalism, a comparison between Switzerland and Canada.
[00:00:30 Text on screen: Opening Remarks; Canada.ca/School; Federations Around the World – Comparing Canada and Switzerland; Contemporary Issues in Canadian Federalism Series :/ Opening remarks; Canada.ca/School; Federations Around the World – Comparing Canada and Switzerland; Contemporary Issues in Canadian Federalism Series:]
André Lecours: This is the last event in a series of 12 that took place on federalism; a series that began in October 2022 and ends today.
Before continuing, I would like to pay tribute to the Algonquian people, the traditional guardians of this land where I am located, at the University of Ottawa, a territory that remains unceded. So I encourage all of you listening across the country to think about the links between your own region and these populations.
So, today's event, Federations around the world, comparison between Canada and Switzerland, focuses mainly on issues of shared governance, democracy and intergovernmental relations. The point here is to see how a federation that has certain similarities with Canada, Switzerland, can help us to identify lessons in good governance, democracy and intergovernmental relations.
After all, there are very few federations that, sociologically speaking, can compare with Canada, and Switzerland, with its multilingualism, is certainly one of those. So to help and organize our thinking on this comparison between Switzerland and Canada, we have two fantastic speakers, two recognized experts in the field of federalism and Swiss federalism and politics in particular. So I will present them to you now.
[00:02:28 Split screen: André Lecours, Sean Müller and Johanna Schnabel]
André Lecours: Sean Müller is an assistant professor at the University of Lausanne. He is a specialist in federalism, in particular shared governance in federations. He is also a specialist in politics and federalism in Switzerland. He holds a master's degree from the University of Friborg and a doctorate from Kent University in England.
[00:02:49 Sean Müller appears in full screen. Text on screen: Sean Müller University of Lausanne / University of Lausanne]
André Lecours: Professor Müller is a recognized authority in the field of comparative federalism.
We also have with us Professor Johanna Schnabel
[00:02:49 Johanna Schnabel appears in full screen. Text on screen: Johanna Schnabel, Ph.D Freie Universität Berlin]
André Lecours: who is a researcher and lecturer at the Chair of German Politics at the Freie Universität in Berlin. She holds a doctorate from the University of Lausanne, Switzerland, and did a post-doctorate at the University of Kent, UK. Professor Schnabel is a specialist in intergovernmental relations, crisis management and financial transfers in federations. Her research also has a comparative angle; in addition to Switzerland, she studied Germany, Australia and Canada.
I would like to thank you all for being with us.
[00:03:46 André Lecours appears in full screen.]
André Lecours: Please feel free to submit your questions via the question and answer system. You can do this throughout the presentations and even the discussion period, so you don't have to wait until the very end to send us your questions.
[00:04:06 Split screen: André Lecours, Sean Müller and Johanna Schnabel]
André Lecours: Each guest will make a brief presentation and we will then have a panel discussion that will include your questions as we receive them. So, Professor Müller, please go ahead with your presentation.
[00:04:27 Split screen: Sean Müller and slide, as described.]
Sean Müller: Thank you very much, André, and thank you to the organizers for inviting me and giving me the opportunity to talk to you a little bit about my favourite subject, which is federalism in Switzerland, while also trying to draw some comparative lessons, which should also be interesting for a non-Swiss audience—or perhaps especially—although not exclusively.
So, I'm going to tell you a little bit, very, very briefly, about the history; then review the most important institutions at the federal level and then finish with a comparison between Canada, Switzerland and other developed, federal democracies, with regard to centralization, the increasing weight of the federal government in Switzerland.
Swiss history can only be understood through its cantons. No one knows exactly when the Swiss Confederation, the Confoederatio Helvetica, which is its Latin name, began. Popular mythology says that it was in 1291 that the former subjects of the Austrian Empire rebelled against new tariffs, which launched a conservative revolution elsewhere to preserve the status quo. So there's this famous vow, this mythical vow that is at the origin of the Swiss Confederation, which says that the Valais wanted to remain free and not be a subject governed from the outside, from Vienna at the time.
The problem is that there aren't really any documents that allow us to verify if this is really the actual year. There is a document from 1291, but it has been proven to be falsified, backdated. However, around 1300, 1315 at the latest, we have a document, a contract establishing this famous confederation. So it was a union between, at first three, then eight and at the very end, 13 cantons, i.e. more or less independent states, which joined forces to preserve their status.
All this worked very well for the 13 cantons until the French invasion. In 1798, the French army invaded the Confederation and created a new state, a unitary state, under the name of the Helvetic Republic. This did not work out well for them at all. Even Napoleon had to admit in 1803 that nature had made Switzerland a federal state, and it would not be wise to try and convince her otherwise. So under Napoleon, we have this famous Act of Mediation from 1803 until 1815, which is a sort of compromise between a confederation with extremely autonomous cantonal entities and the Helvetic republic where there were no cantons, but only districts.
With the defeat of Napoleon in 1815, we returned to the previous system. So we went back, taking a big step backwards. Between 1815 and 1847, there was no real constitution, there was just a federal pact which established the old cantons but which left the new cantons with the status of cantons equal to the old cantons. However, it took a very brief civil war in November 1847, which lasted only 100 days, and which caused some deaths but not many, to establish the Swiss federal state in its modern form.
It is from 1848 that we can really talk about the Swiss Federation, comprising 22 cantons and the Swiss people, who until then had had very little say in the matter. So there hadn't really been a Swiss people; there were just cantons, and it's only since 1848 that the people have been present alongside the cantons. The only addition to the cantons was the creation of new cantons through internal secession, so it's not an addition, but rather an internal secession. I will come back to this later after showing you some historical maps.
[00:09:13 Split screen: Sean Müller and slide, as described.]
Sean Müller: So there, as you can see, we must not forget that we are talking about a very, very small territory. Living in Canada, this isn't something I have to remind you of, but we're talking about really, really small areas. For example, today, the red lines show the current borders of Switzerland starting from Geneva—the westernmost city—to go to Quart, the easternmost capital, it takes three hours by train. There isn't even a plane because they're too close together.
In colour, you see the 13 original cantons that formed the Swiss Confederation. All that changed with Napoleon's system, which created completely artificial entities. You see the canton of Bern; the great canton of Bern was cut in two. A new canton was created, the canton of Léman, which was completely artificial, and which fit into French Cartesian logic. The territory had to be accessible in a single day if you went there on horseback, and these were not at all the historical borders that had been created over the centuries. So already, looking at the map, we can understand why it didn't work; because the borders, the new borders, were completely artificial.
[00:10:44 Split screen: Sean Müller and slide, as described.]
Sean Müller: In 1803, this attempt, this compromise, the Act of Mediation—the mediation between the Unitarists and the Federalists—restored the cantons to their former federation, but forgot some territories that today are part of Switzerland, in particular the canton or the Republic and canton of Valais, Geneva is not there either, therefore the canton of Geneva, the Republic of Geneva, was not part of this compromise of 1803.
And actually it was just in 1815 that we finally have Switzerland in its current borders with the 22 cantons. In 1979, the very last, newest canton, the canton of Jura, which is a French-speaking, Catholic canton created by the secession of the canton of Bern and is predominantly German-speaking and Protestant. So here, this is an internal secession. The Jurassians never wanted to leave Switzerland, nor did they want to join France. But it was simply a matter of raising the status of this territory to the level of a canton like all the other cantons.
[00:12:04 Split screen: Sean Müller and slide, as described.]
Sean Müller: At the institutional level as well, it is very difficult to understand how the Swiss political system works without being familiar with the cantons. So, the National Council, which is the Parliament, the Lower House and the equivalent to your House of Commons, is made up of 200 members. But these 200 members are all elected in cantons. So there is no single constituency in Switzerland. The cantons—the 26 cantons—are the undivided constituencies. And the seats, the 200 seats, are allocated to the cantons according to their demographic weight. The smallest cantons are only entitled to one seat. The largest canton, the canton of Zürich, has 36 seats.
In theory, it is a proportional system. Obviously, with only one seat, you cannot have proportionality in small cantons with only one seat, due to the fact that it is the majority system. But there are only six cantons with only one seat. So overall, the system is proportional, which means that we currently have ten political parties represented in the National Council, which is the Lower House.
Alongside the National Council there is the Council of States, which is the Senate, the Swiss Senate, which is a copy of the American Senate. So when the fathers—there was no mayor. When the fathers of the Swiss Constitution, in 1848, decided on the current system, they were largely inspired by the American system, in particular by creating this perfect bicameralism. So the councillors of state and senators are obviously elected in the cantons, except that here there is parity between the cantons. This is regardless of size—my canton of Glarus with 40,000 inhabitants has two senators, the canton of Zürich with 1.3 million inhabitants also has two. Both chambers have exactly the same weight, so every law, every change to the constitution must be approved in the exactly identical version by both councils in separate sessions. So the 46 senators have exactly the same weight as the 200 national councillors who represent the people.
The Federal Council, the government, is made up of seven members, seven federal councillors. This magic number of seven is inspired not by the American Constitution, but by the French Revolution, which had the Directory. In France, they had five. In Switzerland, we said to ourselves that five is not enough to respond to the diversity, the plurality of the country. So we made it seven. The seven federal councillors are appointed—as are the members of the courts—by the Parliament. So there is no direct election of either the government or the judges. The seven councillors and the judges are elected by the two houses in joint session. In concrete terms, this means that the 46 councillors of state arrive in the Lower House and sit around and behind the national councillors and vote while having one vote per person, which means that the 200 members of the National Council actually count more than the 46 state councillors simply by virtue of being more numerous.
[00:16:02 Split screen: Sean Müller and slide, as described.]
Sean Müller: In addition to representative democracy, there are three instruments that count, which are important for understanding the functioning of both federalism and Swiss democracy, there is the obligatory referendum. Every change to the Federal Constitution must be approved by what is called a double majority. There has to be a popular vote in which not only a popular majority is needed to accept the changes, but also a majority of the cantons. Once again, there are the cantons that are part of the system, in the functioning of Swiss politics.
The optional referendum allows 50,000 citizens to challenge any law decided by the two parliamentary chambers. Any act of the Federal Parliament is only provisional because it can be challenged by 50,000 citizens within 100 days of its publication. This means that 50,000 citizens can challenge a law and request a popular vote where a simple majority is necessary, but also eight cantons. So alongside the 50,000 citizens, there is also the possibility for eight cantons of any size, of any language, of any economic weight, to challenge any act of the Parliament and to request a popular vote, which alone is decisive.
The last possibility to directly influence the rules that govern Switzerland is the popular initiative. The popular initiative allows 100,000 Swiss citizens to change the constitution, more or less in any direction. Now, there are some fundamental limitations. The jus cogens of international law, i.e. everything that is globally accepted as constituting a no-go, cannot be inserted into the constitution. But other than that, anything is possible. Given that we're talking about a constitutional change, here too, a double majority is required, i.e. two "yes" votes, in the same way as for parents, mom and dad, who tell their child that they need two "yes" votes, in this case it's the "yes" votes of the people and the cantons that are needed to change the constitution. In other words, the cantons count as one of the three instruments of direct democracy, alongside political parties, interest groups and political parties.
[00:18:43 Split screen: Sean Müller and slide, as described.]
Sean Müller: The last point I wanted to make today has to do with centralization. With colleagues, we have attempted to understand, since the creation of modern Switzerland in 1848, the degree or location of political power. So, we divided political action into 22 specific areas, from agriculture to defence, to training and health. For each public policy area, we classified the level of legislation between one and seven. Seven means total decentralization and one means total centralization. And we did that for each public policy, for legislation, i.e. making laws, making rules and implementation. And you see here on this graph showing 1848, we did that for every ten years, so more or less from the beginning of Switzerland. Switzerland was very decentralized, there was very little political power held centrally. But in fact, throughout time, since the creation of modern Switzerland, it has been a history of centralization. So often, when delegations from abroad come to Switzerland to find out how to manage decentralization, the first thing we have to tell them is that, in fact, we're specialists in centralization, not decentralization, because that's all we've been doing since the creation of modern Switzerland.
You can also see that there's a gap opening up between the centralization of laws and legislation, and decentralization when it comes to implementation. In other words, implementation, i.e. everything to do with public administration employees, tends to take place at cantonal or even communal or local level, while rules are increasingly decided at national level.
[00:19:58 Split screen: Sean Müller and slide, as described.]
Sean Müller: I'll also show you this in terms of international comparison. This is my last slide. So, what you see there on this graph, it starts in 1950 and ends in 2010. There we've compared the six classic countries with André Lecours. If you have any problems regarding Canada, you can take it up with him. He's the person who is mainly responsible for Canada's positioning here.
So on the horizontal axis, we see the degrees of decentralization. It goes from one to seven, with seven being total decentralization and one being total centralization. Canada, in 1950, starts out at four, four point two and then stays more or less at four for 2010. So Canada has not moved on this axis. Whereas Switzerland was in a more decentralized place than Canada in 1950, and was the most decentralized country—more right-wing, more decentralized in 1950—and today, or rather in 2010, Switzerland is more centralized than Canada, because Switzerland has moved on the scale. It's horizontal.
The vertical axis represents the gap. If I go back, the gap that opens up shows that Switzerland is moving upwards. So the vertical axis shows the gap between legislation and implementation. The higher up, the greater the gap. Here too, you can see that in 1950, Germany was the inventor of administrative decentralization. In Germany, since the founding of modern Germany, laws were decided at the national level and implementation was always the domain of the Länder. This is the opposite of dual federalism that is practised in Canada, less so in Australia, and originally in the United States. Here again, you see that Switzerland—indeed, Switzerland—is the country that has moved the most, both horizontally and vertically. Switzerland has even slightly surpassed the inventor of administrative federalism. Switzerland has become more German than Germany. Canada, on the other hand, has not moved horizontally, or even vertically, in any significant fashion. Canada has remained stable and still dual, still decentralized, while Switzerland has moved significantly upwards and also to the left, which means more centralization. And if you have any questions about how to explain this double change or how to explain Switzerland's change and Canada's lack of change, I'm very happy to go into it during the discussion.
[00:24:15 Split screen: André Lecours, Sean Müller and Johanna Schnabel]
Sean Müller: All right, I'll stop there. It's there to give you some food for thought and I'm happy to expand on any points I mentioned, in the Q&A. Thank you very much.
André Lecours: Thank you very much, Professor Müller. Professor Schnabel, I'll turn things over to you. Go ahead.
[00:24:36 Split screen: Johanna Schnabel and slide, as described.]
Johanna Schnabel: Thanks and thank you very much for the invitation to this event. After Sean's presentation of the key characteristics of Switzerland and its comparison with Canada, I'd like to talk about intergovernmental cooperation. I imagine this is an activity that you have all participated in one way or another.
[00:25:05 Split screen: Johanna Schnabel and slide, as described.]
Johanna Schnabel: To begin my presentation, I would like to present to you already some differences between Canada and Switzerland in relation to the question why is there collaboration between the federal government and the entities federated in the provinces and cantons, or between the provinces and cantons themselves, although I'm going to talk less about that.
So Sean talked about it; in Canada we find what we call double or dual federalism, I'm not sure what exactly it's called. It's a structure—the level of government, in fact—that is responsible for legislation, but also implements its own laws. In Switzerland, on the other hand, we find administrative federalism, so that means that the cantons are responsible for implementing the majority of laws, almost all federal laws. This in itself encourages cooperation between the Confederation and the cantons.
On the other hand, the fact that Canada doesn't have this kind of federalism doesn't mean that there's no collaboration, no need for collaboration. In Canada, there's what's known as the federal spending power, which you may be familiar with, which also exists in Switzerland, but to a much more limited extent. In fact, the federal spending power is almost a tool for collaboration. It allows the federal government to collaborate with the provinces and influence their policy. So that too, in principle, can encourage collaboration.
In Switzerland there is another instrument, that of federal consultations to which the cantons have privileged access. The cantons are consulted for each bill at the federal level. So this also strongly encourages collaboration between the two levels of government.
In addition, in both countries there are certain constitutional principles, certain articles that also encourage or require collaboration. There are agreements that have been signed between the federal government and the provinces and cantons to also encourage collaboration. Then, in some areas there are shared powers, areas where both levels of government can act. Here too, there are incentives for collaboration. And finally, there are political advantages, situations where both levels of government think it is better to collaborate.
So there you go. Here, to put it very simply, are some ideas about why there's collaboration in the two countries. There is a lot of collaboration happening between the civil service. For example, in your country, I imagine that sometimes you call your provincial colleagues to ask them a question, for example, maybe you send them a WhatsApp, an email or other message. On the other hand, the most important mechanism, I would venture to say, because it's the most visible, is that of the intergovernmental councils.
[00:28:09 Split screen: Johanna Schnabel and slide, as described.]
Johanna Schnabel: And here I can already show you some differences between Canada and Switzerland. An intergovernmental council is a council that brings together ministers, prime ministers or entire governments, from both levels of government or federated entities.
Here, on the left, you can see a press conference following a session of the First Ministers' Meeting, the most political council in Canada. Here you can see we have the federal Prime Minister who met with his provincial counterparts. On the right, you see a session of the conference of cantonal governments, which is different. The conference of cantonal governments, first of all, is a conference of governments as a whole. In fact, each cantonal government decides who will represent it at the sessions. Then there is the conference of cantonal governments. The federal government is not a member of this conference. So that already is very different from Canada, where there is a council in which the federal government participates. Of course, in Switzerland it can be invited sometimes, but it does not have the right to vote.
So, these two structures—which in themselves are already different—are, as I said, the most political councils, so to speak. In addition to these two councils, there are also councils that discuss much more specific matters according to policy areas. The two examples I added here are the Council of Ministers of Education in Canada and its equivalent in Switzerland, which is the Swiss Conference of Cantonal Directors of Public Education.
[00:29:57 Split screen: Johanna Schnabel and slide, as described.]
Johanna Schnabel: On this slide you see the structures of all the intergovernmental councils in the two countries. I suppose I've made things a little more complicated by creating this graphic, because at first glance, it looks rather similar. But in fact, I'm going to explain that there are quite significant differences between the two countries. So for Canada—I'm not going to be arrogant and explain your own system to you, but still in terms of the structures—I think it's important to repeat this so that I can then compare with Switzerland.
So you see in Canada, there are two parallel structures. There are structures, i.e. conferences, councils, forums, whatever they are called, which are meetings of either the prime ministers or the ministers of the provinces and territories. You probably know the Council of the Federation, which brings together the premiers of the provinces. Then at the vertical level, the conferences in which the federal government participates—there's a similar structure, which is the prime ministers' meetings I spoke about earlier.
Now, what's interesting, and here Canada is a unique case, is that there are several councils, for example in matters of finance and health where there are meetings between the provinces and territories and afterwards, meetings with the federal government. To my knowledge, this only exists in Canada. Then there are councils that are purely vertical in which the federal government, provinces and territories participate, such as the environment council. Then, there are horizontal councils in which only the provinces and territories participate, and the federal government does not participate, for example, in education. Additionally, there are regional conferences in some regions.
Now let's move on to Switzerland. First of all, it's important to know that the federal government does not participate in any of the councils and conferences that exist. But there are still two parallel structures and it is above all a national structure, and in fact, a regional structure. At the national level, there is the conference of cantonal governments in which all the cantons participate and which, to a great extent, works together with... there are quite close relationships, with conferences in specific policy areas. For example, in education, finance ministers also have a national council. And in parallel with that, in the four major regions of Switzerland there are also conferences, equivalents of the national conference of cantonal governments and councils that exist in specific political domains. For example, in Western Switzerland, there is the conference of governments of Western Switzerland, i.e. the French-speaking ones, and a French-speaking education council.
So, although I said that the federal government does not participate, is not a member of these councils, but the councils still very often work with the federal government. They send letters to the Federal Council, to the federal parliament, they participate in working groups with the Federal Council, they are listened to by the federal parliament. So, even if there is no vertical structure, there is still strong vertical collaboration to be seen.
[00:33:41 Split screen: Johanna Schnabel and slide, as described.]
Johanna Schnabel: Now, one last big difference between Switzerland and Canada in relation to the organization of the system of councils or conferences, is that in Switzerland, there is the house of cantons where most of the national councils and conferences are located, which has developed into a working and meeting place for the cantonal representatives, who can also easily meet each other. In Canada, all I've been able to find is the secretariat of the Canadian intergovernmental conferences, which provides services to help the conferences organize sessions, but plays no coordinating political role.
[00:34:18 Split screen: Johanna Schnabel and slide, as described.]
Johanna Schnabel: Now, I have spoken about the rather technical and descriptive aspects of the system of the two countries, I would now like to speak to you about two important issues when it comes to organizing intergovernmental collaboration.
The first issue is the level of formalization. The important question is: Is it necessary to have significant formalization to facilitate intergovernmental collaboration? Formalization strengthens the reliability and continuity of intergovernmental collaboration and reduces dependence on political will, thus reducing the impact that a change of government can have. But on the other hand, it still creates a certain rigidity.
We can see the differences between Canada and Switzerland. In Switzerland, almost all conferences have internal organizational regulations, which define the number of meetings per year, often fixing meetings years in advance, and defining the rules for the election of the president, decision making, etc. It's pretty well formalized. In Canada, on the other hand, there are many more meetings that take place on an ad hoc basis, for example when the federal government organizes a meeting.
[00:35:51 Split screen: Johanna Schnabel and slide, as described.]
Johanna Schnabel: The second issue is the question of the role for the federal government. Here too, we see a fairly significant difference. I think these two images show this quite well. On the right, we see the end of a meeting between the prime ministers. I chose this image because you can see Prime Minister Trudeau walking in front of his provincial colleagues. That's because this is a meeting that is heavily dominated by the federal government, which may or may not organize the meetings depending on whether it feels like meeting with the provincial premiers.
So, in Switzerland, as I said, the federal government doesn't take part in council meetings, but it does collaborate quite a bit with these councils. And here we have a picture, as you can see, during the pandemic where the federal government made a lot of decisions but also consulted on a fairly regular basis. This is the gentleman on the left, the president of the conference of health ministers, and who then organized a press conference where they were next to each other and informed the media of the decisions to be taken.
Let's compare Switzerland and Canada, and also compare the councils within Canada. Horizontal councils, i.e. those in which the federal government does not participate, could be seen as a potential counterweight to the federal government, because they allow the provinces and cantons to come together and form a counterweight.
[00:37:48 Split screen: Johanna Schnabel and slide, as described.]
Johanna Schnabel: To show you the consequences of these differences between the role of the federal government in the councils, I've shown you a quote from the Premier of Quebec, who found it very insulting that the Prime Minister of Canada refused to meet with his provincial and territorial counterparts, no doubt. After all, it's not surprising that it's the Premier of Quebec, but I think it still shows the dependence on intergovernmental collaboration, on the federal government's willingness to collaborate.
[00:38:23 Split screen: Johanna Schnabel and slide, as described.]
Johanna Schnabel: In Switzerland, on the other hand, after meetings, we often hear and see these kinds of results. This is a federal law, which is a bill, and the cantons have taken a position, expressed their opinion on this law and sought to influence this law.
Now to summarize,
[00:38:52 Split screen: Johanna Schnabel and slide, as described.]
Johanna Schnabel: I'm going to end on this note, offering you a summary that simplifies things, that tries to show the most visible differences between the two countries, but that of course hides many of the complexities and nuances that exist. But generally speaking, we can say that in Switzerland, intergovernmental collaboration is more intensive, regular and reliable, whereas in Canada, collaboration is much more ad hoc. Of course, it varies across policy areas over time, but overall you can see these differences. In Switzerland, intergovernmental collaboration is very often a consultation tool and helps create compromises between the federal government and the cantons or between the cantons themselves. In Canada, on the other hand, the federal government is much more dominant, which leads to a fair amount of conflict. Of course, there are also conflicts in Switzerland, but we focus much more on the search for compromise.
That said, I'm always very hesitant to draw lessons and promote one system as the best, because you have to bear in mind that we're talking about quite different systems, quite different geographies. Canada is much larger than Switzerland. In Switzerland, it is easy to cross several cantonal borders in one day. When Sean goes to work, I think he crosses at least three cantons. So inevitably, there's a need for much more intergovernmental collaboration. There are different needs, and this is also very important, quite different political cultures. In Switzerland, compromise is very important and consensus is very important. This is perhaps a little less the case in Canada.
With that, I end my speech and I thank you for your attention.
[00:40:52 Split screen : André Lecours, Sean Müller and Johanna Schnabel]
André Lecours: Thank you very much, Professor Schnabel. It's interesting to remember that geography, scale, is important in federalism. It is true that when one has to cross several constituent entities, it clearly shows the greater need for closer collaboration. Very interesting.
I want to remind everyone who is listening to us
[00:41:26 André Lecours appears in full screen.]
André Lecours: that you can send us your questions.
[12:41:30 am Text on screen: Discussion; Canada.ca/School; Federations Around theDiscussion World – Comparing Canada and Switzerland; Contemporary Issues in Canadian Federalism Series : / : / Canada.ca/School; Federations Around the World – Comparing Canada and Switzerland; Contemporary Issues in Canadian Federalism Series:]
André Lecours: I'm going to start with a question for each one of our experts. Professor Müller, let's start with you. So, when you think about federalism in Canada, or even without thinking about it, you think about autonomy. But of course, federalism is also about governing together. It is a mixture of autonomy and shared governance. Can you tell us a little more about how this shared governance manifests itself in Switzerland compared to what you know of Canada?
[00:42:18 Sean Müller appears in full screen.]
Sean Müller: Of course, we often forget that federalism has two pillars, two principles. On the one hand, autonomy and on the other hand, joint action and sharing governance. In fact, historically, shared governance even predates autonomy, because at the origin of federalism, there was this desire to do something together, to come together and create something better, higher, by working together.
So, in concrete terms, in Switzerland, the federal government, even if it wanted to, was not able to impose its will on the cantons. A constitutional basis is required for any state action, and a double majority is needed to change the constitution. For any act, for any federal law, the cantons are consulted, the political parties are also consulted, the interest groups are also consulted, a majority must be created. This need to create a majority, ironically, encourages the inclusion of a greater number of political players than in majority systems. So the majority system encourages the creation of majorities during elections, but it is actually the electoral system that manufactures these majorities of seats in a more or less artificial way, because you can completely become the majority in terms of seats without necessarily having a majority of votes. It's the electoral system that rewards you.
In Switzerland, it is exactly the opposite. Even if you have a majority of seats, that doesn't mean you are the majority. Because there's always the possibility that the people themselves, through direct democracy, can break the will of the majority and create a new majority. So the federal government has every interest in having allies where it can find them, particularly in the cantons, which does not mean that the cantons were always included. So the cantons also had to fight to be taken seriously. This provision that the cantons can challenge any federal act was put in the constitution in 1874, but was not used until 2003.
So it was a dormant provision that was never used and the cantons had to use this provision to remind the federal government that they also have veto power, and it was necessary to include them, to consult with them. So it's quite politicized, but it's politicized in a sense where there are very few appeals or complaints because the federal court in Switzerland does not have the possibility of invalidating laws, even laws that contradict the Constitution. Popular logic is more important than legal logic. This opens a door to negotiations, it opens a door to the need to have transversal coalitions, both in terms of political parties, and in terms of the federal, cantonal and local political levels.
So the Swiss cantons are like lobbies, because they are not formally included in the federal process, but because they are so important, they are a key player in decision-making at the federal level. But in fact, what's behind this need to create the broadest possible coalitions—it's informal, it's a question of friendship, of political necessity.
[00:46:14 Split screen: André Lecours, Sean Müller and Johanna Schnabel]
André Lecours: Thank you very much, Professor Müller. Professor Schnabel, my question focuses on—or considers—linguistic diversity. One of the reasons why we are comparing Switzerland and Canada, in addition to their federal character, of course, is their multilingual nature. Multilingualism—at least in Canada's case, where there is official bilingualism, and in Switzerland, where there is official multilingualism. Can you tell us a little about the impact of this sociological characteristic, multilingualism, which is also found in the constitutions of the two countries, in the laws of the two countries? Can you tell us about the impact of multilingualism on intergovernmental relations? In your opinion, are these impacts comparable in Switzerland and Canada?
Johanna Schnabel: Thank you very much for the question.
[00:47:15 Johanna Schnabel appears in full screen.]
Johanna Schnabel: First of all, I would like to point out that the fact that we speak multiple languagesin these two countries is one of the reasons for federalism in Canada and Switzerland. So, I live in Germany and in Germany we only speak one language. Indeed, the question sometimes arises: should Germany really be federal? The answer is yes, because it's part of its history and because it is significantly linked to Germany's past. But of course in Canada and Switzerland it's much more important because cultural autonomy—linguistic autonomy—is quite important there and it is very difficult to imagine these two countries without a federal system.
After all, we must still recognize that this represents a greater communication challenge. In Germany, the rest of Germany sometimes has difficulty understanding our friends in Bavaria; however, it's not because of the language but because of other things. In Switzerland and Canada, sometimes the language can pose a challenge, it can be expensive, but it's part of the culture, it's part of both countries. So there you have it, federalism is the system that takes this into account.
There are several ways that speaking multiple languagesinfluences intergovernmental collaboration. In Canada, a fairly visible aspect is the existence of a Conference of Ministers of the Francophonie. This is a conference dedicated to promoting the needs and interests of French-speaking Canadians. But I think what's even more visible is Quebec's role in intergovernmental collaboration. The fact that Quebec has pushed hard for the creation of horizontal structures, for greater collaboration between the provinces, precisely to represent a counterweight to the federal government. In my opinion, collaboration and intergovernmental relations in Canada cannot be understood without considering Quebec's role and its desire to maintain its cultural and linguistic identity.
On the other hand, in Switzerland, it also has an impact and it particularly has an impact to the extent that there is much greater collaboration depending on the linguistic region. In western Switzerland, as I presented to you earlier, the cantons work together and of course it's easier for them to do so because they speak the same language. In education, it's trickier to imagine a national collaboration, which exists of course, but which creates the basis for education policy, and then the more specific collaboration that takes place within the linguistic regions.
So there's a common syllabus in Western Switzerland, in French, and a common syllabus in German-speaking Switzerland, in German, of course. And then, Ticino, where people speak Italian, has its own syllabus, but still works with Western Switzerland whenever possible, given that Italian is not French. So, of course there are limits. The thing that's important to know, I think, for Switzerland, is that even if there are linguistic regions that work together, intercantonal collaboration is quite important. This doesn't prevent collaboration at the national level. So that's the key lesson to learn, that there's a very strong inter-cantonal collaboration that isn't prevented by the fact that we speak different languages. Thank you.
[00:51:13 Split screen: André Lecours, Sean Müller and Johanna Schnabel]
André Lecours: Thank you very much. Please keep sending us your questions. We'll get to them soon. Before going to questions from our participants, I have one last question for our two guests. What best practice do you think Switzerland has that can inspire other federations such as the Canadian Federation, keeping in mind that there is a particular geographical, cultural and historical context in Switzerland? Is there something, either very concrete or more philosophical, that a federation like Canada could borrow from Switzerland? Professor Schnabel, let's start with you this time.
Johanna Schnabel: I'd be delighted to. Here, it's probably a good thing that I'm not Swiss myself, and that I'm studying Switzerland from the outside, after having lived in Switzerland for some time.
[00:52:20 Johanna Schnabel appears in full screen.]
Johanna Schnabel: And there are two aspects that have always struck me in Switzerland. On the one hand—Sean talked about this when discussing the different mechanisms that exist in Switzerland—there is a certain pragmatism, they find solutions to concrete problems without getting lost in ideological debates that come to nothing. Of course ideology is important, but there's a certain pragmatism to be found in Switzerland, and also a sense of anticipation. So we try to anticipate rather than react to what happened in the past. I think these are two fairly important aspects of the way the Swiss system works in general, and also how Swiss federalism works.
Another aspect, and maybe Sean will contradict me on this, but compared to Switzerland and other federations, I have the impression that the cantons in Switzerland accept their responsibilities to a much greater extent. I spoke a few years ago to people who work at the Ministry of Finance in the canton of Vaud, asking them the question, "What are you going to do if the Confederation cuts its transfer payments to the cantons?" Their response was, "We are responsible towards our population in relation to our finances, so it is our problem to sort it out and we will make sure to solve it."
Of course, perhaps they were a little overly nice about it, but I think we can still see, in comparison with other federal countries, that the cantons are ready to accept their responsibilities and aren't immediately going to Bern to ask for more money.
And then one final element, which is also quite important, is the principle of subsidiarity, which is also represented in Switzerland, and which the European Union has subsequently tried to copy, but still the idea of trying to solve problems at the lowest possible level. Thank you.
[00:54:30 Split screen: André Lecours, Sean Müller and Johanna Schnabel]
André Lecours: Thank you, thank you very much. Professor Müller, what do you think?
Sean Müller: Well, in my opinion, one of the key elements that makes Swiss federalism, or Swiss politics, work so well at the moment, in any case,
[00:54:46 Sean Müller appears in full screen.]
Sean Müller: is that there's a certain congruence between the sharing of power federally, that is to say vertically, between the federal government, the cantons and the municipalities. The municipalities also have their own taxes, they have their own areas where they are autonomous. It varies a little from the east to the west of Switzerland, but in fact there are three levels that are quite competent. But power sharing is also practised horizontally between political parties.
So at the federal level, out of the seven ministers, there are four political parties, from the left to the right, including the centre. So you've got a coalition, without it really being a coalition, but there is a sharing of power between the political parties. And this is also the case in all 26 cantonal governments. There are no cantonal governments—or very few, only one since last Sunday—that are dominated by a single political party, whereas you find coalitions of three or four political parties everywhere.
The same goes for municipalities. So almost everywhere, you have coalitions between the different parties. Sharing power between political parties and between the government and the people, and sharing power between the federal level, the cantons and the communes, follows the same logic. No one has all the power, either at the federal level, cantonal level, or in the municipalities. So they have to share power from the outset, making it all the more easy to share it with other political levels.
So there isn't really a contradiction, as can be found in some parliamentary federations (without naming names), where on the one hand you have parliamentary sovereignty, which is supreme, and the need to share power between the national and regional levels, where the two logics contradict each other in a way.
In Switzerland, at least in terms of these two dimensions of power sharing, we're pretty much in competition. And perhaps the result of all this is greater trust between the various stakeholders. There's also polarization, and a certain segment of society feels left out of politics, and protests against all forms of established politics; but the vast majority of citizens and residents have a great deal of confidence in the political system, because they feel included, because they see that it's very easy to petition or launch initiatives, and the government or various governments are quick to respond. As a government, it is quite difficult to ask for confidence from citizens if we, as a government, do not also give a certain confidence to citizens through direct democracy. So, there is also a certain congruence in the sharing of power between the authorities and the people.
[00:57:56 Split screen: André Lecours, Sean Müller and Johanna Schnabel]
André Lecours: Thank you very much, Professor Müller. So, now let's get to some questions from our participants. Professor Müller, let's start with you, on an issue that I think you touched on indirectly. For us in Canada, when we think of Switzerland, there are certain inevitable references. I would imagine, first of all, we think of chocolate, the Alps, but we also tend to think it's a rich country. The standard of living is very high. And so, does Switzerland have all these great political things—direct democracy, a very collaborative federal system—because it is rich? Was it the smooth functioning of these institutions that contributed to its wealth? How do you see the Swiss standard of living in relation to everything you discussed?
Sean Müller: Obviously, this is not the only explanation, because there are other countries that are very rich or even richer than Switzerland that have much less direct democracy, or that are not even democracies or even federations for that matter. But for Switzerland—a country with no natural resources, a small country stuck between the great empires, Germany, France, Italy, Austria to the east—without really having a common identification in terms of language or religion, it's really only the political institutions that serve as a point of reference.
So, political institutions, federalism and direct democracy all serve to unite a fairly diverse people, but this is obviously not the only explanation that helps to understand well-being. There's banking secrecy that has been practised for a very, very long time. There is the good fortune to have been spared from both world wars while the rest of Europe was destroyed, which allowed Switzerland a certain advantage in starting after World War II because its infrastructure remained intact. There is a lot of immigration from Italy, Portugal, Spain, the former Yugoslavia countries, and when the economy was no longer doing so well, we simply exported unemployment, sending them back home, so to speak.
So there are other factors that perhaps explain the country's wealth. Unfortunately, there is no other country that is both as federal and has as much direct democracy as Switzerland to really make a comparison. We can go to a lower level, compare the cantons. The richest cantons do not necessarily have more direct democracy than the poorer cantons. So, unfortunately, being a student of federalism, I would like to be able to say yes, it is because of federalism that we are rich. But unfortunately, that's not how things happen.
André Lecours: Thank you. Professor Schnabel, what do you think?
Johanna Schnabel: Regarding that, I think I have to trust what Sean says because he's really the expert on that. I would just like to add that Swiss chocolate is indeed very good.
André Lecours: You are right about that. My next question will be for you, Professor Schnabel, and I will read it verbatim. The close, regular and consultative nature of the Swiss federal system of government is remarkable. Do you have any advice for fostering this collaboration between different levels of government? For Canadian federal officials who would like greater intergovernmental collaboration, what can you say to them?
Johanna Schnabel: Indeed, there is some advice to give,
[01:02:11 Johanna Schnabel appears in full screen.]
Johanna Schnabel: but of course we have to take into account that collaboration between different levels of government often still relies on political will. Of course, the fact that it works more or less well in Switzerland is not due to the fact that chocolate is distributed at meetings, that everyone is happy. They've put in place certain structures that we also found in other countries and which show that they encourage collaboration and facilitate exchange between the two levels of government.
I think that in principle, it's about having a certain level, a certain degree of formalization, to ensure that there are regular meetings and that we don't just meet from time to time when we feel like it, but that we commit to meeting, let's say, at least once a year, maybe even several times, and that the meetings are fixed in advance and that they take place. If there is a change of government, we will still meet, I think that's very important. And then we can create this commitment by adopting internal regulations that formalize these rules. Recreating structures that are supported by working groups, for example at the level of civil servants, also encourages collaboration and, above all, creates a certain continuity.
I think that's what's important. We put in place structures that ensure that there's collaboration on a regular basis and that we collaborate in such a way... as often as possible, because that can also create rigidity and a very high workload.
Then there is also another tool that exists in the country, in Europe in any case, even in unitary countries. What is important to know is that we can put in place principles of collaboration in the statutes. For example, in Germany, the internal regulations of the federal government have an article which says that the federal government must regularly consult the Länder regarding its agenda. It's written down, it's in black and white, it's not a law, but it creates an important commitment and the federal government does it, it meets with ministers and presidents twice a year to discuss important issues at that time.
So, another possibility is to ensure—and I think Canada actually does this quite well—the establishment of complementary councils, which are not just... that everything is based on the meeting of prime ministers, but that have councils in different specific areas who can also prepare proposals after the prime ministers have discussed, or sometimes there is no need even for the prime ministers to participate. So, creating a certain redundancy in the intergovernmental system can encourage collaboration, but of course, political will is also important.
[01:05:31 Split screen: André Lecours, Sean Müller and Johanna Schnabel]
André Lecours: Thank you. The next question is for Professor Müller. You have shown quite convincingly that Switzerland is centralized and explained that the experience of federalism in Switzerland is one which, in contemporary times at least, is one of centralization. Do you have examples, perhaps examples of concrete public policies where Switzerland has become centralized? Also, how do you explain this centralization, since the Swiss diversity that gave birth to federalism still exists? So, if there has been no sociological change, why have there been changes in the degree of centralization in Switzerland?
Sean Müller: Well, as the graph showed,
[01:02:11 Sean Müller appears in full screen.]
Sean Müller : there wasn't really any one moment when Switzerland centralized. Rather it has been a very, very long movement, but clearly a stable one in the sense that there are changes, which lead to changes, which lead to changes. So, let's look at some concrete examples. It has been a string of mini centralizations in public domains which, when we add them, we get this panorama that we looked at.
So, regarding criminal procedural law, until two or three years ago, each canton decided on its own procedural criminal law. I'm not a lawyer, so I have no idea what that entails, but for the lawyers we consulted, it's a huge change that concerns them a lot. Now there's a single code of criminal procedure for all of Switzerland. Apparently, this means that before, in Geneva, they used to wear gowns and wigs in court, whereas in Bern they didn't.
And the protection of non-smokers. We passed a law ten years ago which prohibited smoking in public places, including restaurants, unless the canton had a procedure to allow what we call smoking rooms—i.e. restaurants where we still had the right to smoke indoors—but it couldn't exceed a certain number of square meters. So then there was a new law that nationalized the protection of non-smokers. There were certain laws in certain cantons, certain cantons went even further than the federal law, but there was nothing at the national level.
Maternity leave—Switzerland was very late with the introduction of maternity leave, the 14-week maternity leave was first introduced in 2004. Women's suffrage, also, came very, very late. It was first introduced in 1971.
So there are plenty of moments—in fact, every area of public policy has its moments of mini centralization. For two years, there have been centres—but often in the area of legislation and quite rarely in the area of application. Perhaps an example for centralization in implementation is that for three years now there have been federally-run asylum centres. So before, when the asylum seeker applied for asylum, they were sent directly to the cantons and the cantons had to house them, feed them. Now, for the last three years, there have been federal centres to accommodate asylum seekers.
Otherwise, the changes have been mostly in the area of legislation. This overview also perhaps answers the second question. How can this be explained? It's often, or almost always, requests from civil society, either political parties, interest groups, or even companies that want to make it easier for lawyers, or companies that are fed up with having different legislation in place in different cantons, because we're talking about a country with nine million inhabitants, 26 different regimes. This is far too much for a society that is very mobile, which is very integrated from a socio-economic point of view. So it's often the need or the desire to simplify, and it's also a certain modernization that makes cantonal borders count for less, or at any rate, there's less understanding of why there should be 26 or 10 different political systems in a small society like Switzerland.
[01:10:22 Split screen: André Lecours, Sean Müller and Johanna Schnabel]
André Lecours: Thank you very much. Professor Schnabel, do you have anything to add?
Johanna Schnabel: I have another example which I think may be very... Can you hear me?
André Lecours: Go ahead.
Johanna Schnabel: An example that might interest people in Canada in particular and it is an example in terms of education.
[01:10:45 Johanna Schnabel appears in full screen.]
Johanna Schnabel: At the beginning of the 21st century, there was a movement in Switzerland to harmonize education policy, school structures and we tried to encourage the cantons to increase the level of harmonization. It took a little while and, ultimately, what we did was modify the constitution. There is an article on education, which was added to the federal constitution, that strongly encourages the cantons to harmonize school structures and syllabuses and to authorize the federal government to intervene if the cantons fail to do so.
That, I imagine, is very difficult to picture in Canada. It has not yet been implemented in Switzerland, it is also difficult to picture, I imagine that it could happen in Switzerland. But when the federal government invoked this article, putting pressure on some cantons not to abandon the teaching of French in primary school— In that case you've got a situation of centralization, a certain centralization in an area that most federal countries have reserved for federated entities.
[01:12:14 Split screen: André Lecours, Sean Müller and Johanna Schnabel]
André Lecours: Thank you. Starting with you, Professor Schnabel, I'm going to bounce around a little and ask you another question from our participants about how to think about the powers and responsibilities of federal, cantonal and provincial governments. We heard that in Switzerland, there was a certain desire for rationalization which may emerge from civil society, and is in part the result of the small size of the Swiss territory. But more broadly, how should a federation think about the allocation of relative responsibilities between different levels of government? Can Switzerland serve as an inspiration in some way here?
Johanna Schnabel: I think that if we find the answer to this question this evening, we will receive the Nobel Prize for federalism. The answer that economists would give you would be that as soon as there are economies of scale, the federal government needs to step in. As soon as you need solutions tailored to local and regional needs, it has to be the provinces or cantons. I think the reality is much more difficult, and as a political scientist, I have to add that in the end, it's all about political negotiations, which of course depend on power plays, but which must also take into account the needs and preferences of each society.
So, I think the answer to the question is very different in countries like Germany or Austria, which are very homogeneous, and countries like Canada or Switzerland, which are much more diverse in terms of their territory. On the other hand, I'd just like to add that there is, I think, a tension, something to think about, which is very important, and that is that there is a kind of... We have to link the fact that, on the one hand, we aim to maintain diversity and allow federated entities to find solutions that are adapted to their needs and preferences, and at the same time, we want, from a national, federal point of view, a certain equality and to balance these two tensions. That is the great challenge of federalism.
André Lecours: Thank you. Professor Müller, do you have any thoughts on this?
Sean Müller: Yes, paradoxically,
[01:15:21 Sean Müller appears in full screen.]
Sean Müller: the fact that the Swiss political system is so open—anyone can propose constitutional changes, anyone can challenge a federal law, and the same thing happens in the 26 cantons, and the same thing is happening in the 2000 municipalities. The fact of having this extreme openness at the same time closes the system and introduces a certain rigidity, because everyone is so used to having to compromise that they don't move forward.
It's hard to move forward if you have to compromise with everyone who has even a little power. But at the same time, so much time is spent reviewing small questions, mini-questions, such as the law on the protection of non-smokers or the criminal procedural code. For each of these questions, there was a popular vote throughout Switzerland. There were debates that went on for three months. The political parties had to position themselves, the parliament had to vote, the media, the journalists had to do interviews for each of these small questions.
So the big question—national cohesion, or the weight of the cantons, or the importance or content of the Swiss national identity—never really comes up for review. We spend so much time on small issues that we don't have time to revisit the big issue. But maybe that's a blessing, because if we really tackled the big question, we'd realize that, in fact, we don't really agree on what it means to be Swiss or to be federalist. Maybe it's better that we don't have too much time for the big questions, we're so busy with the little ones.
[01:17:06 Split screen: André Lecours, Sean Müller and Johanna Schnabel]
André Lecours: Thank you. We have one last question, more of an institutional nature, so I will ask it to you, Professor Müller, but Professor Schnabel, you could also add what you think about it. Let me read it to you. Are there any mechanisms in the Swiss constitution for reviewing the powers of the cantons and the federal government, and thus alleviating the political tensions that can lead to demands for sovereignty and independence, for example?
Sean Müller: The Swiss constitution is not really important because we don't have a constitutional court. A constitution only has a certain importance if it serves as a point of reference for invalidating, for interpreting inferior laws as normal laws. But the Swiss federal court does not have this power. The Constitution forces the court to apply federal laws as they are. It does not give it the power to review laws on their constitutionality. So the Swiss constitution is rather a working tool which serves as a more or less vague guide, which gives certain powers to the Confederation, often in the form of possibilities. The Confederation can legislate in the area of protection of non-smokers. If the Confederation decides not to legislate, it does not legislate.
The big question of the division of powers was last raised in 2004. We call it the great reform of Swiss federalism, the RPT (Réforme du Fédéralisme Suisse). We have reformed the system of financial equalization and distributed some powers. Some powers were centralized, others were decentralized, but for the vast majority of powers, we simply said that the Confederation and the cantons must collaborate better with each other.
So the big question, to answer the question, there's not really a mechanism in the Constitution, because the Constitution itself is pretty useless on a practical level. But in conventions, in mutual trust, the Confederation and the cantons do just that. Sporadically, for each little question, when it arises, the question, who pays, who finances, who applies. We must not forget about the implementation—that is, a federal law is decided, but it's not the federal bureaucrats who apply these laws, it's the cantonal civil servants who apply the laws. Some cantons apply laws to the letter, and other cantons have some flexibility in implementing federal laws. But a certain indifference is tolerated, and is even part of Swiss federalism. Geneva doesn't care about what the people in St. Gallen are doing in the East; they don't know, they don't even want to know, they're happy not to.
André Lecours: Thank you very much. Professor Schnabel, one last comment from you, on this question or any others.
Johanna Schnabel: I'd like to contradict, Sean, just for the sake of debate; but I quite agree that in the end it's more about the indirect mechanisms
[01:20:40 Johanna Schnabel appears in full screen.]
Johanna Schnabel: that have an impact on these kinds of questions. There is no specific mechanism in the Constitution. But there is still the whole system that is based on the idea of consensus, of compromise. We shouldn't be naive either: there are conflicts, there are tensions, but there are plenty of mechanisms to resolve them.
I'm using my imagination a little here, but if we imagine a situation such as in Spain, where Catalonia wanted to leave Spain and become independent, declare its independence. The central government refused, was not even open to negotiation with Catalonia. I find it hard to imagine that happening in Switzerland. I find it hard to imagine that a canton would want to leave Switzerland. In Germany, nobody would be willing to accept that, nor in Switzerland or France. In any case, nobody has tried, But let's imagine it were to happen; I think the federal government in Switzerland would at least agree to meet the government of the canton and discuss it. I think that in itself says a lot about Switzerland.
[01:21:53 Split screen: André Lecours, Sean Müller and Johanna Schnabel]
Sean Müller: I think the question then would be, was the cantonal majority clear enough? Was the question clear enough? Taking inspiration from another case, which we all know very well.
André Lecours: There you go, we've come full circle. Perhaps we will have a next session in the future to explain how Canadian federalism can inspire Swiss federalism, because we know that obviously, in federal systems that are highly collaborative, we can often have a lack of innovation, a lack of change. As Professor Müller said, often when we consult on several small issues, there are things which, perhaps, tend towards the status quo. So we'll have to leave that for next time.
For now, I want to thank you both for your participation. It has been very stimulating.
[00:22:57 André Lecours appears in full screen.]
André Lecours: I think we learned a lot.
[01:23:05 Text on the screen: Closing Remarks; Canada.ca/School; Federations Around the World – Comparing Canada and Switzerland; Contemporary Issues in Canadian Federalism Series: / Conclusion; Canada.ca/Ecole; Les fédérations dans le mode – comparison entre le Canada et la Suisse; Série sur les enjeux contemporains du fédéralisme canadien:]
André Lecours: There is a great deal of wisdom in Swiss democracy and federalism. Unfortunately, both of these seem difficult to reproduce elsewhere, but there are still, as I think you said, principles and also very concrete aspects of formalization at the intergovernmental level that could be taken up and reproduced here. Now I'd like to thank our two guests and thank everyone who's been listening to us. I hope you all enjoy the rest of your day and have good thoughts about Switzerland during the rest of your day. Thank you and goodbye.
Sean Müller: Thank you as well.
[1:23:52 CSPS logo appears on screen.]
[01:23:57 The Government of Canada logo appears, then fades to black.]
